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Abstract
Iterated applications of belief change operators are essen-
tial for different scenarios such as that of ontology evolution
where new information is not presented at once but only in
piecemeal fashion within a sequence. I discuss iterated appli-
cations of so called reinterpretation operators that trace con-
flicts between ontologies back to the ambiguous of symbols
and that provide conflict resolution strategies with bridging
axioms. The discussion centers on adaptations of the classi-
cal iteration postulates according to Darwiche and Pearl. The
main result of the paper is that reinterpretation operators ful-
fill the postulates for sequences containing only atomic trig-
gers. For complex triggers, a fulfillment is not guaranteed and
indeed there are different reasons for the different postulates
why they should not be fulfilled in the particular scenario of
ontology revision with well developed ontologies.
1 Introduction
Iterated applications of belief change operators are essen-
tial for different scenarios such as that of ontology evolution
where new information is not presented at once but only in
piecemeal fashion within a sequence. Ontology evolution is
a form of ontology change (Flouris et al. 2008) where an on-
tology modification is triggered by changes in the domain or
in the conceptualization. The response to the change is the
application of (a set of) predefined operators.
In this paper I consider the special scenario where an on-
tology (called the receiver’s ontology) has to be changed
along the arrival of a sequence of triggering bits of ontology
fragments coming from another ontology (sender’s ontol-
ogy). In the terminology of Flouris et al. (Flouris et al. 2008)
the one-step change would be termed ontology merge as the
purpose is to get a better understanding of the domain from
merging two ontologies over the same domain. As in our set-
ting the merge is directed I call the kind of change operation
iterated ontology revision.
One instance of iterated ontology revision
is given by iterated reinterpretation operators
(Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010). In these operators, con-
flicts between the trigger and the receiver’s ontology is
explained by ambiguous use of terms. Consider an example
of two online library systems with ontologies: the sender
may use Article to denote publications in journals whereas
the receiver may use Article to denote publications in
journals or proceeding volumes. As the ontologies are
assumed to be over the same domain, the receiver guesses
relations on relations between her and the sender’s uses
and stipulates them as bridging axioms, e.g., stating that all
articles in the sender’s sense are articles in the receiver’s
sense.
Now, a challenging aspect is to define adequateness cri-
teria that iterated ontology revision operators should fulfill.
I consider the classical iteration postulates of Darwiche and
Pearl (Darwiche and Pearl 1994) as possible candidates and
state whether they are fulfilled by the reinterpretation opera-
tors. Moreover I discuss, for each of them, whether it should
be fulfilled at all. The main result of the paper is that rein-
terpretation operators fulfill the postulates sequences with
atomic triggers. For sequences of complex triggers, a ful-
fillment is not guaranteed and indeed there are different
reasons—corresponding to different postulates—why they
should not be fulfilled in the particular scenario of ontology
revision with well developed ontologies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After some
logical preliminaries and general terminology (Sect. 2) the
necessary definitions for reinterpretation operators are reca-
pitulated (Sect. 3). Before the sections on related work and
the conclusion, the adapted postulates for iterated revision,
results on their fulfillment by reinterpretation operators, and
a discussion of the results are given in Sect. 4.
2 Terminology and Logical Preliminaries
The reinterpretation framework described in the following
works for any FOL theory but we consider here finite knowl-
edge bases formulated in description logics.
A non-logical DL vocabulary consists of concept symbols
(= atomic concepts) NC , role symbols NR, and individual
constants Ni. Using these, more complex concept descrip-
tions can be built up in a recursive fashion. The set of pos-
sible concept constructors depends on the specific DL. We
consider in particular the basic constructors ⊓,⊔,¬, ∃. C(V)
is the set of all possible concept descriptions that can be built
from the symbols in V in the given description logic.
The semantics is the usual Tarskian semantics based on
interpretations I = (∆I , ·I) with a domain ∆I and de-
notation function ·I which gives for every c ∈ Ni an ele-
ment cI ∈ ∆I , for every atomic concept A ∈ NC a set
AI ⊆ ∆I and for every role symbol R ∈ NR a binary re-
lation RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I . The denotation function is extended
recursively to all concept descriptions in the usual manner.
For the ones we use here, we have (C ⊓ D)I = CI ∩ DI ;
(C⊔D)I = CI∪DI ; (¬C)I = ∆I\CI ; (∃R.C)I = {x ∈
∆I | There is y ∈ CI s.t. (x, y) ∈ RI}. Here C,D ∈ C(V)
and R ∈ NR. From concept descriptions one can built ax-
ioms which can be evaluated as true in (satisfied by) or false
in (satisfied by) an interpretation. We consider TBox (termi-
nological Box) axioms of the form
• C ⊑ D (concept subsumption) for C,D ∈ C(V) with
semantics: I |= C ⊑ D iff CI ⊆ DI ;
• R1 ⊑ R2 (role subsumption) for R1, R2 ∈ NR with se-
mantics I |= R1 ⊑ R2 iff (R1)I ⊆ (R2)I
Moreover, we consider ABox axioms (assertional axioms)
of the form C(a) and R(a, b) for C ∈ C(V), a, b ∈ Ni and
R ∈ NR. The semantics is I |= C(a) iff aI ∈ CI and
I |= R(a, b) iff (a, b) ∈ RI . We call ABox axioms of the
form A(a) and ¬A(a) with A ∈ Ni concept assertions or
concept-based literals. Aˆ stands for A or ¬A. Additionally,
equalities a .= b, a, b ∈ Ni may be allowed.
Consistency (= satisfiability) of a set of axioms X means
that there is an interpretation I making all axioms in X true,
for short I |= X . Entailment is defined as usual byO1 |= O2
iff for all I: If I |= O1, then I |= O2. A consequence op-
erator Cn gives the set of all axioms following from a set:
Cn(X) = {ax | X |= ax}. If necessary, one can spec-
ify the vocabulary of the axioms: CnV(X) is the set of ax-
ioms over V following from X . X ≡V Y is shorthand for
CnV(X) = CnV(Y ). By V(O) we denote all non-logical
symbols occurring in the set of axiomsO. C(O) = C(V(O)).
The ontology notion of this paper slightly extends the one
known from the semantic web and DL community—the ex-
tension relying on the distinction between an internal vocab-
ulary V ′ and a public vocabulary V :
Definition 1 An ontologyO is a triple O = (O,V ,V ′) con-
sisting of a set of axioms O over a logic with non-logical
symbols V (the public vocabulary) and V ′ (the internal vo-
cabulary).
In the following I will abuse terminology by calling also the
set of axioms O ontology.
Let O1
⊢
O2 be the dual remainder sets modulo O2
(Delgrande 2008). This is the set of inclusion maximal sub-
sets X of O1 that are consistent with O2, i.e., X ∈ O1
⊢
O2
iff X ⊆ O1, X ∪ O2 is consistent and for all Y ⊆ O1 with
X ( Y the set Y ∪O2 is not consistent.
We are going to deal with substitutions as means to real-
ize name space dissociations. The set of ambiguity compli-
ant resolution substitutions, denoted AR(V ,V ′), consists of
substitutions of symbols in V by symbols in V∪V ′. Here, we
assume V ∩ V ′ = ∅ where V ′ is the set of symbols used for
internalization. The substitutions in AR(V ,V ′) get as input
a non-logical symbol in V (a constant, an atomic concept or
role in DL speak) and map it either to itself or to a new non-
logical symbol (of the same type) in V ′. The set of symbols
s ∈ V for which σ(s) 6= s is called the support of σ and
is denoted sp(σ). In the following I use postfix notation for
substitutions, i.e., Xσ = σ(X). Moreover, I use the follow-
ing shorthands spi(σ) = sp(σ)∩Ni and spCR(σ) = sp(σ)∩
(NC ∪ NR). A substitution with support S is also denoted
by σS . For substitutions σ1, σ2 ∈ AR(V ,V ′) we define an
ordering by: σ1 ≤ σ2 iff sp(σ1) ⊆ sp(σ2). AR(V ,V ′) can
be partitioned into equivalence classes of substitutions that
have the same support. We assume that for every equivalence
class a representative substitution Φ(S) ∈ AR(V ,V ′) with
support S is fixed. Φ is called a disambiguation schema.
3 Reinterpretation Operators
This section recapitulates the definitions of on-
tology revision operators called reinterpreta-
tion operators (Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010;
¨Ozc¸ep 2008). The envisioned scenario is that of two
agents holding well-developed ontologies, one called
receiver’s ontology, the other called sender’s ontology. The
ontologies are over the same domain and the receiver gets
bits of information from the sender’s ontology that she
wants to integrate into her ontology in order to get a better,
more fine-grained model of the domain. A challenging
aspect is to preserve the consistency of the ontology. The
kind of inconsistency that is considered here is that of
inter-ontological ambiguity: the sender and the receiver
may use the same symbol with different meanings (compare
for example the different uses of Article in the example
below).
So, the conflict resolution strategy that is exploited by the
reinterpretation operators is based on disambiguating sym-
bols. The sender or the receiver has to reinterpret an ambigu-
ous symbol. In the more interesting non-monotonic setting,
that I consider in this paper, it is always the receiver who
reinterprets the ambiguous symbol—by storing the old sym-
bol in a new name space and relating her use of the symbols
to the sender’s use by bridging axioms. This is in line with
classical (prioritized) belief revision where one has full trust
in the trigger information. In (Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010)
these reinterpretation operators are called type-2 operators,
contrasting them with type-1 operators in which it is the
sender’s terminology that is reinterpreted.
The weak reinterpretation operators ⊗ and strong rein-
terpretation operators ⊙ are binary operators with a finite
set of ontology axioms ontology as left and right argument.
The following example ( ¨Ozc¸ep 2012) demonstrates the main
ideas for the weak reinterpretation operators.
Example 1 Consider the sets of ontology axioms O1, O2 of
the receiver and sender, resp.:
O1 = {Article(pr1), Article(pr2),¬Article(bo1)}
O2 = {¬Article(pr1)}
Applying the weak reinterpretation operator⊗ gives the fol-
lowing set of axioms:
O1 ⊗ O2 = {Article
′(pr1), Article
′(pr2),
¬Article′(bo1),¬Article(pr1),
Article ⊑ Article′}
For the purpose of the example I assume that only concept
and role symbols but not constant symbols may be used am-
biguously. So, the above conflict between the sender’s and
receiver’s ontology can only be caused by different uses of
the atomic concept Article. The receiver (holder of O1)
gives priority to the sender’s use of Article over her use
of Article, and hence she adds ¬Article(pr1) into the re-
sult O1 ⊗ O2. The receiver’s use of Article is internalized,
i.e., all occurrences of Article in O1 are substituted by a
new symbol Article′. This step of internalization will also
be called the step of dissociation or disambiguation. Addi-
tionally, the receiver adds hypotheses on the semantical re-
latedness (bridging axioms) of her and the sender’s use of
Article, here Article ⊑ Article′ which states that Article
is a subconcept of Article′.
Technically, the disambiguation is realized by uniform sub-
stitutions from AR(V ,V ′) (see section on logical prelimi-
naries). For the disambiguation, one has to deal with the a
potential multiplicity of conflicts. The minimal conflict sym-
bol sets defined below describe the smallest sets of symbols
which have to be disambiguated in order to resolve conflicts.
Definition 2 For ontologies O1, O2 over V the set of min-
imal conflicting symbols sets, MCS(O1, O2), is defined as
follows:
MCS(O1, O2) =
{ S ⊆ V | There is a σS ∈ AR(V ,V ′), s.t.
O1σS ∪O2 is consistent, and for
all σS1 ∈ AR(V ,V ′) with σS1 < σS
O1σS1 ∪O2 is not consistent. }
Following the strategy of AGM partial meet revi-
sion (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985), we as-
sume that a selection function γ1 selects candidates
from MCS(O1, O2) to be used for the resolution:
γ1(MCS(O1, O2)) ⊆ MCS(O1, O2). So the symbol set de-
fined by S# =
⋃
γ1(MCS(O1, O2)) is the set of symbols
which will be internalized.
To regain as much as possible from the receiver’s ontol-
ogy in the ontology revision result, the disambiguated sym-
bols of S# are related by bridging axioms. Depending on
what kind of bridging axioms are chosen, different revision
operators result. In this paper we consider two classes of
bridging axioms, the simple bridging axioms and the strong
bridging axioms ( ¨Ozc¸ep 2008). Let σ = σS ∈ AR(V ,V ′)
be a substitution with support S ⊆ V . Let P be a concept or
role symbol in S, σ(P ) = P ′.
Definition 3 Let σ = σS ∈ AR(V ,V ′) for S ⊆ V ∩ (NC ∪
NR). The set of simple bridging axioms w.r.t. σ is
B(σ) = {P ⊑ P ′, P ′ ⊑ P | P ∈ S}
The set of strong bridging axioms w.r.t. σ is defined as:
B˙(σ,O) =
{Cσ ⊑ s | C ∈ C(O), s ∈ spCR(σ), O |= C ⊑ s}∪
{s ⊑ Cσ | C ∈ C(O), s ∈ spCR(σ), O |= s ⊑ C}∪
{s
.
= sσ | s ∈ spi(σ)}
In case of conflict, not all bridging axioms of B(S#)
(resp. B˙(S#)) can be added to the integration result (com-
pare Ex. 1). Hence, one searches for subsets that are compat-
ible with the union of the internalized ontology and sender
ontology, O1σ ∪ O2. That means, possible candidate sets
of bridging axioms can be described by dual remainder sets
(see section on logical preliminaries) as B(σ)⊢ (O1σ ∪O2).
Again, as there is no preference for one candidate over
the other we assume that a second selection function γ2 is
given with γ2(B(σ)
⊢
(O1σ ∪ O2)) ⊆ (B(σ)
⊢
(O1σ ∪ O2).
The intersections of the selected bridging axioms is the set
of bridging axioms added to the integration result. (Com-
pare this with the partial meet revision functions of AGM
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985)).
Definition 4 Let V ,V ′ be disjoint vocabularies andΦ a dis-
ambiguation scheme. Moreover let γ1, γ2 be selection func-
tions and for short let γ = (γ1, γ2). For any ontologyO1 and
O2 over V let S# =
⋃
γ1(MCS(O1, O2)) and σ = Φ(S#).
Then the weak reinterpretation operator ⊗γ and the strong
reinterpretation operator ⊙γ are defined as follows:
O1 ⊗γ O2 = O1σ ∪O2 ∪
⋂
γ2
(
B(σ)
⊢
(O1σ ∪O2)
)
O1 ⊙γ O2 = O1σ ∪O2 ∪⋂
γ2
(
B˙(σ,O1)
⊢
(O1σ ∪O2)
)
The definition for weak reinterpretation operators is the
same as in ( ¨Ozc¸ep 2008), the definition of the strong opera-
tors is an extension.
In the following I will simplify the discussion by simpli-
fying the first step of internalization: In the internalization
step now all symbols of the receiver are internalized. There
is only a selection function for bridging axioms. Due to the
fact that the maximal candidates of bridging axioms are used
in the reinterpretation operators unnecessary internalizations
do not occur. I therefore can write in the following, e.g., ⊗γ
instead of ⊗γ .
A particularly interesting case of ontol-
ogy change appears in the context of ABox
update (Ahmeti, Calvanese, and Polleres 2014;
Gutierrez, Hurtado, and Vaisman 2011), where the trig-
ger informations are assertional axioms (ABox) axioms.
I consider the special case that only atomic bits from the
sender ontology occur as trigger, namely, the trigger O2 is
of the form O2 = {A(a)} or of the form O2 = {¬A(a)}.
That is, the trigger is a concept assertion with an atomic
symbol (A ∈ NC ) or the negated atomic symbols ¬A. For
this special case particular strong reinterpretation operators
can be defined (Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010). The first
class assumes that within the underlying DL a most specific
concept w.r.t. an ontology exists. C is a most specific
concept for b in the ontology O iff O |= C(b) and for all
C′ s.t. O |= C′(b) also O |= C ⊑ C′. The most specific
concept is unique modulo concept equivalence (w.r.t. O),
hence it is denoted by mscO(b).
Definition 5 Let O = (O,V ,V ′) be an ontology, Φ a dis-
ambiguation scheme, A ∈ V ∩NC and b ∈ V ∩Ni. Assume
σ = [A/A′] is the substitution fixed by Φ and assume that
mscO(b) exists. The msc-based strong reinterpretation oper-
ators for concept-based literals ⊡) are defined as follows:
If O ∪ {A(b)} 6|= ⊥ let O ⊡ A(b) = O ∪ {A(b)}. Else:
O ⊡ A(b) =
σ(O) ∪ {A(b), A′ ⊑ A,A ⊑ A′ ⊔mscOσ(b)}
If O∪{¬A(b)} 6|= ⊥, let O⊡¬A(b) = O∪{¬A(b)}. Else:
O ⊡ ¬A(b) =
σ(O) ∪ {¬A(b), A ⊑ A′, A′ ⊑ A ⊔mscOσ(b)}
The following examples illustrates the second case.
Example 2 Assume that the receiver’s ontology from the
beginning is extended with two additional facts on the
“problematic” entity pr1:
O+1 = O1 ∪ {publishedIn(pr1, proc1), P roceed(proc1)}
The most specific concept of pr1 w.r.t. O+1 is
mscO+
1
(pr1) = Article ⊓ ∃publishedIn.Proceed
Hence the result of strong reinterpretation w.r.t. triggering
concept assertions O+1 ⊡ ¬Article(pr1) adds the following
additional bridging axiom
Article′ ⊑ Article⊔ (Article′ ⊓∃publishedIn.Proceed)
This says that the wider use of Article by the receiver adds
(only) those publications in proceedings into the extension.
The selection-based strong operators for triggering literals
provide more bridging axioms between the internalized and
non-internalized symbols.
Definition 6 Let O = (O,V ,V ′) be an ontology, Φ a dis-
ambiguation scheme, A ∈ V ∩NC and b ∈ V ∩Ni. Assume
σ = [A/A′] is the substitution fixed by Φ and that mscO(b)
exists. Moreover, let sel be an arbitrary selection function,
defined as sel(X) ⊆ X . The selection-based strong reinter-
pretation operators for concept-based literals ⊕sel) are de-
fined as follows (using auxiliary definitions for the specific
bridging axioms):
oa(O,A(b),K ′) = {A ⊑ A′ ⊔ C | C ∈ C(V ∪ V ′),
Oσ |= C(b) and A /∈ V(C)}
oa(O,¬A(b), A′) = {A′ ⊑ A ⊔ C | C ∈ C(V ∪ V ′),
Oσ |= C(b) and A /∈ V(C)}
O ⊕sel α =
{
O ∪ {α} if O ∪ {α} 6|= ⊥
O ⊗ {α} ∪ sel(oa(O,α,A′))
else
Though the complexity of the trigger is low the induced
concept lattice for the reinterpretation with ⊕sel is not triv-
ial as illustrated by Fig. 1. Nonetheless, the figure does not
suggest that the computation of the revision outcome is more
complex than for other revision operators for DL ontologies:
It just illustrates the subsumption connections of the con-
cepts within the resulting ontology; the calculation of the
lattice is not part of constructing the revision result.
Without proof I state here some observations on the con-
servativity of reinterpretation operators. Proofs can be found
in (Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010).
Proposition 1 Let O = (O,V ,V ′) be an ontology, Φ a dis-
ambiguation scheme, A ∈ V ∩ NC and a, c ∈ V ∩ Ni.
Assume σ = [A/A′] is the substitution fixed by Φ and that
mscO(a) exists. Let α = A(a) ǫ = A(c) or α = ¬A(a)
and ǫ = ¬A(c). Let β be an assertion with V(β) ⊆ (V ∪
V(O))\{A}. Let sel be a selection function for bridging ax-
ioms and s˜el a corresponding function selecting correspond-
ing concepts: s˜el(oa(O, Aˆ(a), A′)) = {C | Aˆ ⊑ Aˆ′ ⊔ C ∈
sel(oa(O, Aˆ(a), A′))}.
If O |= ¬α, then
1. O ◦ α |= β iff O |= β
2. O ◦ α |= ǫ iff O ∪ {a 6 .= c} |= ǫ
3. O ⊗ α 6|= ¬ǫ
4. O ⊡ α |= ¬ǫ iff O |= ¬ǫ and
O |= ¬mscO(a)(c)
5. O ⊕sel α |= ¬ǫ iff O |= ¬ǫ and
O |= ¬ ⊓ s˜el(oa2(O,α,A′))[A′/A](c)
4 Postulates for Iterated Reinterpretation
Many forms of ontology change
(Flouris et al. 2008), in particular ontology evolution
(Kharlamov, Zheleznyakov, and Calvanese 2013), require
the iterated application of a change operator under new bits
of informations. In iterated belief revision, this problem is
approached systematically by defining, both, postulates and
operators for iterated applications of revision operators. The
first systematic study of iterated belief revision goes back to
the work of Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche and Pearl 1994)
who stressed the fact that the AGM postulates
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985) are silent
w.r.t. the iterated application of operators. Indeed, the only
postulates that can be said to touch some form of iteration
are those dealing with the revision of conjunctions of
triggers (supplementary postulates 7 and 8).
I state those postulates in a form adapted to ontologies.
(RAGM 7) CnV(O ◦ (O1 ∪O2)) ⊆ CnV((O ◦O1) ∪O2)
Postulate (RAGM 7) says that all sentences over V fol-
lowing from O ◦ (O1 ∪O2) are contained in the revision by
O1 followed by an expansion with O2.
(RAGM 8) If (O ◦O1) ∪O2 6|= ⊥, then :
CnV((O ◦O1) ∪O2) ⊆ Cn
V(O ◦ (O1 ∪O2))
Postulate (RAGM 8) says that all sentences over V fol-
lowing from the result of revising with O1 and expanding
with O2 also follow from revising O with the union of O1
and O2. A precondition is that the revision result by O1 is
compatible with O2.
In general, the reinterpretation operators do not ful-
fill these postulates. This can be shown with exam-
ples similar those provided by Delgrande and Schaub
(Delgrande and Schaub 2003, p. 13).
But if one chooses particular selection functions for the
reinterpretation operators on triggering ontologies, then one
can show that the postulates (RAGM 7) and (RAGM 8)
are fulfilled. This result is similar to an AGM theorem
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985) which says
that a partial meet revision operator on belief sets fulfills all
AGM postulates (in particular the supplementary ones) iff it
can be defined as a transitive relational partial meet revision
operator.
⊤A′|C A′|C A|A′ A|C A|C
A′ A|A
′
C C|AA′ A|A′C (A|C)(A′|C) A′C|A′C C (A′|CA) (A′|CA) A
A A
′(C|A) A′C C AC|A
′
C AC|A′C A′(A|C) C(A|A′) AC A′
AC AC AA
′
A
′
C A
′
C
⊥b
Figure 1: Concept lattice for O ⊕sel A(b) for the case O |= ¬A(b). We assume that the set of concepts chosen by sel is
representable as a concept description C. Here, A1 ⊓ A2 is abbreviated as A1A2, ¬A by A and A1 ⊔ A2 by A1|A2
Definition 7 A selection function γ for bridging axioms is
called a maximum based selection function for bridging ax-
ioms iff the following holds:
1. |γ(X)| = 1 for all ∅ 6= X ⊆ B(σV).
2. If BA1 and BA2 are non-empty sets of bridging axioms
from B(σV), i.e., BA1, BA2 ∈ Pow(B(σV))\ {∅} s.t. for
allX2 ∈ BA2 there is aX1 ∈ BA1 with X2 ⊆ X1, and if
additionally also γ(BA1) ⊆ BA2 holds, then γ(BA2) =
γ(BA1).
Now one can show
Proposition 2 Let O = (O,V ,V ′), O1 = (O1,V , ∅) and
O2 = (O2,V , ∅) be ontologies and γ be a maximum based
selection function for bridging axioms. Then:
If (O ⊗γ O1) ∪ O2 is consistent, then : O ⊗γ (O1 ∪ O2) =
(O ⊗γ O1) ∪O2.
This proposition shows that weak reinterpretation opera-
tors with maximum based selection function fulfill (RAGM
8). Moreover, one sees immediately that they fulfill the pos-
tulate (RAGM 7) because if (O⊗γ O1)∪O2 is inconsistent,
then trivially:
CnV(O ⊗γ (O1 ∪O2)) ⊆ Cn
V((O ⊗γ O1) ∪O2)
The supplementary postulates do not give constraints for
the interesting case where for both triggers genuine revi-
sions have to be applied. This motivated Darwiche and Pearl
(Darwiche and Pearl 1994) to define four iteration postu-
lates which, in an adaptation for the ontology revision sce-
nario, are investigated in the following. The results below
show that the reinterpretation operators in general do not ful-
fill the postulates.
The postulates are, along the original ideas of Dar-
wiche and Pearl (Darwiche and Pearl 1994), described for
finite sets of sentences (here: ontology axioms), and
not for epistemic states as in their follow-up paper
(Darwiche and Pearl 1997). Using the terminology of Fre-
und and Lehmann (Freund and Lehmann 2002), the type of
iterated revision I consider in this paper is static: There
is no (used) encoding of the revision history in an epis-
temic state nor do I consider the dynamic change of revi-
sion operators from step to step. As we consider the justifi-
cation of the iteration postulates not as a whole but one by
one this approach does not stand in contradiction to the in-
sights made in the follow-up paper by Darwiche and Pearl
(Darwiche and Pearl 1997).
In the following postulates, O = (O,V ,V ′) is the ini-
tial ontology, O1 = (O1,V , ∅) the first triggering ontology
and O2 = (O2,V , ∅) the second triggering ontology. Note
that the trigger ontologies do not contain internal symbols—
which fits the idea that only the public parts of the sender
ontologies are communicated.
(RDP 1) If O2 |= O1, then (O ◦O1) ◦O2 ≡V O ◦O2.
In natural language: If the axioms of the second trigger
ontology are stronger than the ones of the first trigger on-
tology, then the two-step outcome (relativized to the public
vocabulary) is already covered by the revision with the sec-
ond trigger ontology.
(RDP 2) If O1 ∪O2 is not consistent,
then (O ◦O1) ◦O2 ≡V O ◦O2.
In natural language: If the axioms of the first and second trig-
ger ontology are incompatible, then the two-step outcome
(relativized to the public vocabulary) is already covered by
the revision with the second trigger ontology.
(RDP 3) If O ◦O2 |= O1, then (O ◦O1) ◦O2 |= O1.
In natural language: If the revision by the second trigger on-
tology entails the first trigger ontology, then the entailment
still holds for the revision with the first ontology followed
by the second trigger ontology.
(RDP 4) If O1 ∪ (O ◦O2) is consistent
then so is O1 ∪ (O ◦O1) ◦O2.
In natural language: If the revision by the second trigger on-
tology is compatible with the first trigger ontology, then the
compatibility still holds for the revision with the first fol-
lowed by the second trigger ontology.
As the following Proposition 3 shows, the fulfillment of
all adapted iteration postulates cannot be guaranteed if the
trigger is an ontology. (This is the same as for the operators
of Delgrande and Schaub (Delgrande and Schaub 2003).) If
the trigger is of atomic nature the situation is different due
to the fact that there is only one symbol to be reinterpreted.
For triggering literals only (RDP 2) is not fulfilled.
Proposition 3 states results for all reinterpretation oper-
ators mentioned in this paper: Regarding the weak opera-
tors a distinction is made between triggering literals and on-
tologies. Table 1 summarizes the results. The rows contain
the operators: The first three having concept-based literals
as triggers, the last two ontologies. The columns except for
the last one refer to the iteration postulates. The last col-
umn gives a reference to the corresponding result in Proposi-
tion 3. Regarding the counterexamples I draw the following
distinction—also reflected in the table: The weak counterex-
amples are those that construct ontologies for a specific se-
lection function. The strong counterexamples are those that
construct ontologies for any selection function.
In the counter examples that were used to prove the neg-
ative results all reinterpretation operators reinterpret only
atomic concepts and roles but not constants. As long as a
conflict resolution by reinterpreting only concepts and roles
is possible, the reinterpretation operators can be modeled by
a suitable definition of a selection function γCR: γCR selects
only sets of bridge axioms that contain all identities for all
constants which, in the end, means that the constants are not
reinterpreted. In this case I call γCR a selection function that
prefers the reinterpretation of role and concept symbols.
Proposition 3 Regarding the fulfillment of the
adapted iteration postulates of Darwiche and Pearl
(Darwiche and Pearl 1997) the following results hold.
1. Reinterpretation operators for concept-based triggers
(⊗,⊡,⊕sel) fulfill (RDP 1), (RDP 3) and (RDP 4).
There are ontologies O,O1,O2 such that ⊗,⊡ and ⊕sel
(for all selection functions sel) do not fulfill (RDP 2).
There are ontologies O,O1,O2 and a selection function
sel such that ⊕sel does not fulfill (RDP 3) and does not
fulfill (RDP 4).
2. For weak reinterpretation operators over triggering on-
tologies ⊗γ the following holds:
For all postulates (RDP x), 1 ≤ x ≤ 3, there are ontolo-
gies O,O1,O2 such that for all selection functions γCR
that prefer the reinterpretation of role and concept sym-
bols ⊗γ does not fulfill (RDP x).
There are ontologies O,O1,O2 and a selection function
γCR that prefer the reinterpretation of role and concept
symbols such that ⊗γ does not fulfill (RDP 4).
3. For strong reinterpretation operators over triggering on-
tologies ⊙γ the following holds:
For all postulates (RDP 1), (RDP 3), (RDP 4) there are
ontologies O,O1,O2 and selection functions γ such that
⊙γ does not fulfill any of them.
There are ontologiesO,O1,O2 such that for all selection
functions γCR that prefer the reinterpretation of concepts
and role symbols ⊙γ does not fulfill (RDP 2).
I discuss the outcomes of the proposition for the four
postulates one by one starting with (RDP 2) which (in its
original form given by Darwiche and Pearl) evoked most of
the criticism. Regarding this postulate I follow the argument
of Delgrande and Schaub (Delgrande and Schaub 2003) ac-
cording to which (RDP 2) may make sense only for non-
complex triggers. For complex triggers, say in our case:
complex ontologies O1 (and O2), does not work. Assume
O1 is made out of two sub-ontologies O11 und O12 s.t. only
O12 is not compatible with O2. All those assertions that fol-
low from O ◦ O1 on the basis of O11 should be conserved
after the revision with O2. But according to (RDP 2) am-
nesic revision would be allowed if O2 would not entail O11:
All sentences inferred withO11 would be eliminated in favor
of the new ontology O2.
Regarding the first iteration postulate, the fol-
lowing simple example by Delgrande and Schaub
(Delgrande and Schaub 2003) demonstrates its ques-
tionable status. Actually, for the proof of Proposition
3.2 I use adapted variants of this example. Consider the
ontologies O = {¬A(a)}, O1 = {(A ⊔ B)(a)} und
O2 = {A(a)} |= O1. Let γ be a selection function that
prefers the reinterpretation of concept and role symbols.
The second ontology O2 ist stronger than the first ontology
O1. Revision with O2 leads to an ontology in which B(a)
does not hold: O ⊗γ O2 6|= B(a). The revision with the
first ontology leads to an ontology in which B(a) holds:
O⊗γ O1 = {¬A(a), (A⊔B)(a)} |= B(a). The revision by
the first and then by the second ontology gives an ontology
that still entails B(a):
(O ⊗γ O1)⊗
γ O2 = {¬A(a), (A ⊔B)(a), A
′(a′),
A ⊑ A′, a
.
= a′, B ⊑ B′,
B′ ⊑ B} |= B(a)
All preconditions in the antecedent of (RDP 1) are fulfilled
but not the succedens: (O ⊗γ O1)⊗γ O2 6≡V O ⊗γ O2.
There is no plausible revision operator for this particular
ontology setting that would fulfill (RDP 1). Such an operator
would have to fulfill O ◦O1 |= B(a) as O and O1 are com-
patible. The revision with O2 should not eliminate B(a) as
B(a) is not relevant for the conflict: (O ◦O1) ◦O2 |= B(a).
Clearly, one could define syntax-sensitive revision operators
on belief bases s.t. (O ◦ O1) ◦ O2 6|= B(a) so that the ful-
fillment of (RDP 1) could be achieved also for this ontol-
ogy configuration. But this does not change the situation that
also (O ◦ O1) ◦ O2 |= B(a) should be fulfilled. Moreover,
syntax-sensitive belief-base operators are not appropriate for
Operator (RDP 1) (RDP 2) (RDP 3) (RDP 4) Proposition
3.x
⊗ + – + + 1
⊕sel + – (∀ sel) + +
⊡ + – + +
⊗γ – (∀γCR) – (∀γCR) – (∀γCR) – (∃γCR) 2
⊙γ – (∃γCR) – (∀γCR) – (∃γCR) – (∃γCR) 3
Table 1: Results of Proposition 3
A + entry means that the postulate is fulfilled for all ontologies. A – entry means that there is an ontology such that the postulate
is not fulfilled (only used for triggering literals). An entry of type – (∀ sel) resp. – (∀γ) resp. – (∀γCR) means that there are
ontologies s.t. for all selection functions sel resp. γ resp. γCR the postulate is not fulfilled. An entry of type – (∃γCR) means,
that there is a selection function γCR such that the postulate is not fulfilled.
the revision of ontologies for which we would like to en-
sure (unique) syntax insensitive representations. So the only
possibility for ◦ to fulfill (RDP 1) is that O ◦ O2 |= B(a)
holds. Such an operator ◦ that fulfills these conditions can
be defined : O entails (¬A ⊔ B)(a) and (¬A ⊔ ¬B)(a).
If ◦ has a selection function γ that chooses (¬A ⊔ B)(a),
then O ◦O2 would entail B(a). But one could equally have
a selection function γ′ such that O ◦ O2 6|= B(a) or even
O ◦O2 |= ¬B(a). There is no adequate reason for assuming
that one has to prefer γ over γ′.
The counter example against (RDP 1) refers to triggering
ontologies. For non-complex triggers such as concept-based
literals a counter example cannot be constructed. Indeed: In
this case all reinterpretation operators fulfill (RDP 1) (be-
sides (RDP 3) and (RDP 4) ( see Proposition 3.1).
Regarding the weak reinterpretation operator for trigger-
ing ontologies ⊗γ one can construct examples such that for
all selection functions γ that prefer the reinterpretation of
concept and role symbols ⊗γ does not fulfill the postulate
(RDP 3) (Proposition 3.2). For strong reinterpretation op-
erators for triggering ontologies one can at least construct
ontologies and at least one selection function showing the
non-fulfillment (RDP 3). The counter example for the weak
variants is based on the interplay of trivial revision (consis-
tency case) and non-trivial revision (inconsistency case):
O = {A(a),¬B(a) ∨ ¬A(c), A(b) ∨ ¬A(e)}
O1 = {¬A(b)}
O2 = {¬A(a), B(a), A(c) ∨ ¬A(b), A(e)}
O and O1 are chosen such that they are compatible and so
O ⊗γ O1 = O ∪ O1 |= ¬A(e). Due to the antecedens in
postulate (RDP 3) the revision by the second triggering on-
tology O2 gives an ontology O ⊗γ O2 that entails the first
triggerO1. The conflict resolution forO2∪O is such that O1
is not effected by it. But a previous revision withO1 requires
a different (additional) conflict resolution with O2 such that
O1 is not entailed anymore: (O⊗γO1)⊗γO2 6|= {¬A(b)}(=
O1). The reason that ¬A(b) cannot be inferred anymore is
due to the fact that the conflict resolution for O ⊗γ O1 and
O2 leads to a reinterpretation of A, and due to the fact that
the assertion ¬A(e), which follows from O ⊗γ O1, has the
same polarity as ¬A(b): namely, it is also negated.
This lost of¬A(b) is due to the construction of the reinter-
pretation operators which implement a uniform reinterpreta-
tion: In case of conflicts all occurrences of symbols involved
in the conflict are internalized. Only by introducing bridging
axioms is it possible to regain assertions in the public vo-
cabulary. But when the bridging axioms are not expressive
enough, then old sentences of the receiver (such as ¬A(b) in
this example) may not be entailed anymore. This last discus-
sion regarding (RDP 3) (and similarly for (RDP 4)) cannot
be used as general arguments against (RDP 3) and (RDP 4)
as adequate reinterpretation postulates. One may construct
plausible ontology revision operators fulfilling (RDP 3) and
(RDP 4), but these cannot implement uniform reinterpre-
tation: They would have to do partial reinterpretation (as,
e.g., done by Goeb and colleagues (Goeb et al. 2007)). So,
acceptable arguments against (RDP 3) and (RDP 4) would
have to support the requirement of uniformity within reinter-
pretation. And indeed, there are good arguments in form of
novel postulates that are motivated by typical requirements
in ontology change settings: One wants to preserve the on-
tologies somehow in the ontology revision result and also
wants them to be reconstructible. In particular these require-
ments occur when the ontologies are well-developed.
I describe these postulates for the iterated scenario with a
sequence SEQ of triggering ontologies. Let O = (O,V ,V ′)
be an ontology and let SEQ be a finite sequence of ontology
axioms containing only symbols in the public vocabulary V .
An operator ◦ that fulfills the iterated preservation pos-
tulate for the left argument (Preservation) has to guarantee
that there is a substitution σ s.t. the initial ontology O is
preserved in internalized form Oσ in the result of iterated
revision with a sequence SEQ.
(Preservation) There is a substitution σ s.t.:
Oσ ⊆ O ◦ SEQ
An operator ◦ that fulfills (Reconstruction) has to guaran-
tee the existence of a substitution ρ such that the initial on-
tology O and the set set(SEQ) of all triggering ontologies
in the sequence SEQ are contained in a renamed variant of
the revision result (O ◦ SEQ)ρ.
(Reconstruction) There is a substitution ρ s.t.:
O ∪ set(SEQ) ⊆ (O ◦ SEQ)ρ
All reinterpretation operators of this paper fulfill
both postulates. I state this proposition the proof of
which is a slight adaptation of the proof given in
(Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010) for triggering concept-based
literals.
Proposition 4 LetO = (O,V ,V ′) be an ontology and SEQ
be finite sequence of setts of ontology axioms over V and ◦
a reinterpretation operator for triggering ontologies. Then
there exists σ and ρ, such that :
1. Oσ ⊆ O ◦ SEQ
2. O ∪ set(SEQ) ⊆ (O ◦ SEQ)ρ
3. For all symbols C ∈ V(O) ∪ V one has: C = Cρ.
5 Related Work
The reinterpretation operators are constructed in a
similar fashion as those by Delgrande and Schaub
(Delgrande and Schaub 2003) but differ in that they
are defined not only for propositional logic but also
for DLs (and FOLs). Moreover, I consider different
stronger forms of bridging axioms than the implications of
(Delgrande and Schaub 2003).
Bridging axioms are special mappings that are
used in the reinterpretation operator as auxil-
iary means to implement ontology revision. One
may also consider mappings by themselves as
the objects of revision (Qi, Ji, and Haase 2009;
Meilicke and Stuckenschmidt 2009). A particularly in-
teresting case of mapping revision comes into play with
mappings used in the ontology based data access paradigm
(Calvanese et al. 2009). These mappings are meant to lift
data from relational DBs to the ontology level thereby
mapping between close world of data and the open world of
ontologies. In this setting different forms of inconsistencies
induced by the mappings can be defined (such as local
vs. global inconsistency) and based on this mapping evo-
lution ensuring (one form of consistency) be investigated
(Lembo et al. 2015).
In this paper I used reinterpretation operators as
change operators on ontologies described in DLs. There
are different other approaches that use the ideas of
belief revision for different forms of ontology change
such as ontology evolution over DL-Lite ontologies
(Kharlamov, Zheleznyakov, and Calvanese 2013) or
ontology debugging (Ribeiro and Wassermann 2009).
As the consequence operator over DLs do
not fulfill all preconditions assumed by AGM
(Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985) one cannot
directly transfer AGM constructions and ideas one-to-one
to the DL setting as noted, e.g., by Flouris and col-
leagues (Flouris, Plexousakis, and Antoniou 2005) and
dealt in more depth for non-classical logics by Ribeiro
(Ribeiro 2012). For the definition of the reinterpretation
operators the constraint is not essential. Nonetheless,
they lead to constraints in providing appropriate counter
examples: namely ontologies expressible in the DL at hand.
6 Conclusion
The paper discussed iterative applications of reinterpreta-
tion operators meant to handle conflicts due to ambigu-
ous use of symbols in related and well-developed ontolo-
gies. Reinterpretation operators may also be used for solv-
ing consistencies not due to ambiguity but due to false
information—and indeed, the related revision operators in
(Delgrande and Schaub 2003) do not talk about ambiguity.
But reinterpretation operators cannot be used to solve in-
consistencies that clearly cannot be explained by ambigu-
ity: namely consistencies due to different constraints of the
sender and the receiver regarding the number of possible ob-
jects in the domain (this was discussed under the term rein-
terpretation compatibility in ( ¨Ozc¸ep 2008)).
The reinterpretation for triggering literals were shown to
fulfill (adapted versions of) classical iteration postulates of
Darwiche and Pearl (Darwiche and Pearl 1994) whereas the
reinterpretation operators for ontologies were shown in gen-
eral not to fulfill them. Some of the postulates were criti-
cized for general reasons. Nonetheless, still one may con-
sider other forms of reinterpretation operators that incorpo-
rate the reinterpretation history in order to define dynamic
operators: For example one might weight symbols accord-
ing to the number of times they were reinterpreted and then
use a comparison of the weights in the next iteration step in
order to decided which symbols to reinterpret next.
In addition to the general criticisms I discussed the ade-
quateness of the other postulates in view of the special on-
tology change scenario. Here one cannot guarantee the ful-
fillment by reinterpretation operators that implement a uni-
form reinterpretation. But uniformity is necessary in order
to guarantee the fulfillment of postulates that express the
preservation and reconstructibility of the ontologies in the
revision result.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
For the proof we need the following lemma
Lemma 1 For all X2 ∈ B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1 ∪O2) there is
a X1 ∈ B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1) such that X2 ⊆ X1.
Proof. If OσV ∪ O1 ∪ O2 ∪ X2 is consistent, so is O1 ∪
O2 ∪X2. If X2 is not maximal, then there is a superset X1
in B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1). 
Define the following sets
X1 = γ(B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1))
X2 = γ(B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1 ∪O2))
With this notation we have (O⊗γ O1)∪O2 = OσV ∪O1 ∪
O2 ∪X1 and (O⊗γ O1)∪O2 = OσV ∪O1 ∪O2 ∪X2. As-
sume that (O⊗γ2O1)∪O2 is consistent. Then there is a X ′ ∈
B(σV)
⊢
(OσV∪O1∪O2)withX1 ⊆ X ′. Because of Lemma
1 there is a X ′′ ∈ B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪ O1) with X ′ ⊆ X ′′.
Hence X1 ⊆ X ′′. But as X1 is inclusion maximal, one gets
X1 = X
′′ = X ′ and henceX1 ∈ B(σV)
⊢
(OσV ∪O1∪O2).
Due to Lemma 1 the first precondition for maximum based
selection functions was shown to hold. Now we showed also
that the second condition holds, hence X1 = X2. In partic-
ular: O ⊗γ (O1 ∪O2) = (O ⊗γ O1) ∪O2.
Proof of Proposition 3
All results hold trivially if O is not consistent. So for the
following assume that O is consistent.
Proof of 1. In the following let ◦ ∈ {⊗,⊡,⊕sel}.
Proof for (RDP 1): As O1 and O2 are trigger literals,
O2 |= O1 holds iff O1 = O2. Hence (O ◦ O1) ◦ O2 =
(O ◦ O2) ◦ O2 = O ◦ O2, as the reinterpretation operators
fulfill the success postulate.
Counterexample for (RDP 2): Let O = {A(b)}, O1 =
{A(a)} and O2 = {¬A(a)}. Then O1 ∪ O2 |= ⊥. On the
one hand O ◦ O2 = {A(b),¬A(a)} |= A(b); on the other
hand (O◦O1)◦O2 = {A(b), A(a)}◦2{¬A(a)} 6|= A(b) due
to Proposition 1.3 (for the weak operators) and Proposition
1.4 (for the strong operators) and again due to 1.3 for the
selection based operators ⊕sel, as in this case (O ⊗ O1) ⊗
O2 ≡ (O ⊕sel O1)⊕sel O2.
Proof for (RDP 3): Let O ◦ O2 |= O1.
Case 1: O∪O2 is consistent. As O1 are O2 literals, O2 |=
O1 means that O1 = O2. Now (O ◦O1) ◦ O2 = (O ◦ O2) ◦
O2 = O ∪O2 = O ◦ O2.
Case 2: O ∪ O2 is inconsistent. We show the proof for
O2 = {A(a)}. (The case that O2 = {¬A(a)} is proved
similarly.) Subcase 2.1: A /∈ V(O1). Then from O ◦2 O2 |=
O1 and Proposition 1.1, it follows that O |= O1, hence (O ◦
O1) = O ∪ O1. Because of 1.1 one has: (O ∪ O1) ◦ O2 |=
O1. Subcase 2.2: A ∈ V(O1). Let ◦ = ⊗. Because of O ◦
O2 |= O1 and Proposition 1.3 it must be the case that O1
contains A positively, i.e., O1 = {A(c)}. Because ⊗ fulfills
the success postulate O⊗ {A(c)} |= {A(c)} and hence also
(O⊗{A(c)})∪{a 6
.
= c} |= {A(c)}. Because of Proposition
1.2 one gets (O ⊗ {A(c)}) ⊗2 {A(a)} |= {A(c)}. Now
consider the case ◦ = ⊡. If A is positive in O1, then O1 =
{A(c)}. In this case again Proposition 1.2 gives the result
(O ⊡ O1) ⊡ O2 |= O1. In the other case O1 is of the form
O1 = {¬A(c)}; using the assumptionO◦O2 |= O1 one gets
with Proposition 1.4 that O |= ¬mscO(a)(c) and O |= O1.
In particular O⊡ O1 = O ∪O1 ≡ O. Also mscO⊡O1(a) =
mscO(a). Hence fromO |= ¬mscO(a)(c)we getO⊡O1 |=
¬mscO⊡O1(a)(c). Because O ⊡ O1 |= O1 holds, one can
infer with Proposition 1.4 that (O⊡O1)⊡2O2 |= O1. With
a similar argument and Proposition 1.5 one can show that
the results holds for ◦ = ⊕sel.
Proof for (RDP 4): Let O1 ∪ (O ◦ O2) be consistent.
Case 1: O ∪ O2 is consistent. Then O ◦ O2 = O ∪ O2
and so O1 ∪ (O ∪ O2) 6|= ⊥ due to assumption. But then
O ◦ O1 = O ∪O1.
Case 2: O ∪O2 is not consistent. If also (O ◦ O1) ∪O2is
consistent, then (O ◦ O1) ◦ O2 = (O ◦ O1) ∪ O2. As O ◦
O1 |= O1 we then have (O ◦ O1) ◦ O2 |= O1, in particular
O1 ∪ (O ◦O1) ◦O2) 6|= ⊥. Therefore consider now the case
that (O ◦ O1) ∪O2 is inconsistent.
We show the result for O2 = {A(a)} (The argument for
negative literals is similar). Subcase 2.1: A /∈ V(O1). Due
to success, O ◦O1 |= O1 and with Proposition 1.1 it follows
that (O◦O1)◦O2 |= O1. Because (O◦O1)◦O2 is consistent
so is O1 ∪ (O ◦O1)◦O2. Subcase 2.2: A ∈ V(O1). Assume
O1∪(O◦O1)◦O2 |= ⊥. IsO1 of formO1 = {¬A(c)}, then
due to Proposition 1.2 it holds that O1 ∪O ◦ O1 ∪ {a 6
.
= c}
is not consistent. Because O ◦ O1 |= O1 this can be the
case only if O ◦ O1 |= a
.
= c. Then O1 = {¬A(a)} which
contradicts the assumption O1 ∪ (O ◦ O2) 6|= ⊥.
If O1 has the form O1 = {A(c)}, then, due to Proposition
1.3, this can only be the case if ◦ = ⊡ or ◦ = ⊕sel. With the
assumption that (O1∪(O◦O1)◦O2 is not consistent, i.e. (O◦
A(c))◦A(a) |= ¬A(c), one could infer with Proposition 1.4
and 1.5 that O◦A(c) |= ¬A(c) which would mean that O1∪
(O ◦ O1) is not consistent—-contradicting the consistency
of O ⊡ O1 and the fact that O ⊡2 O1 |= O1.
Proof of 2. Counter example for (RDP 1): Consider
O = {¬A(a)}
O1 = {(A ⊔B)(a)}
O2 = {A(a)}
Let be γ an arbitrary selection function that prefers the rein-
terpretation of role and concept symbols. Then we get on
the one hand O⊗γ O2 = {¬A′(a′), A(a), A′ ⊑ A, a
.
= a′}.
And so O ⊗γ O2 6|= B(a). On the other hand O ⊗γ O1 =
{¬A(a), (A ⊔B)(a)} |= B(a). And last
(O ⊗γ O1)⊗
γ O2 = {¬A
′(a′), (A′ ⊔B′)(a′), A(a),
A′ ⊑ A, a
.
= a′, B ⊑ B′,
B′ ⊑ B}
But then (O ⊗γ O1) |= B(a),
Counter example for (RDP 2): See counter example for
triggering literals.
Counter example for (RDP 3):
O = {A(a), ∃R1.A ⊑ ¬B,R1(a, c), ∃R2.A ⊑ A,
R2(b, e)}
O1 = {¬A(b)}
O2 = {¬A(a), B(a), A(e), ∃R3.A ⊑ A,R3(c, b)}
For all selection functions γ that prefer the reinterpretation
of concept and role symbols one has:
O ⊗γ O1 = O ∪O1
O ⊗γ O2 = OσV ∪O2 ∪ B(σV) \ {A
′ ⊑ A}
|= ¬A(b)
(O ⊗γ O1)⊗
γ O2 = (O ∪O1)σV ∪O2 ∪
B(σV) \ {A
′ ⊑ A,A ⊑ A′}
6|= ¬A(b)
Note that the O,O1, O2 have simple structures and do not
presuppose complex DL constructors.
Counter example for (RDP 4): Consider:
O = {B(a), B(b) ∨C(b)}
O1 = {¬A(a),¬B(b)}
O2 = {¬B(a) ∨A(a),¬B(b),¬C(b)}
Choose γ such that the following results hold:
O ⊗γ2 O2 = {B
′(a′), B′(b′) ∨ C′(b′),
¬B(a) ∨ A(a),¬B(b),¬C(b),
a
.
= a′, b
.
= b′,
C ⊑ C′, C′ ⊑ C,B ⊑ B′}
6|= ¬
∧
O1
O ⊗γ2 O1 = {B(a), B(b) ∨C(b),
¬A(a),¬B(b)} |= C(b)
(O ⊗γ2 O1)⊗
γ
2 O2 = {B
′(a′), B′(b′) ∨ C′(b′),
¬A′(a′),¬B′(b′),¬B ⊔ A(a),
¬B(b),¬C(b), a
.
= a′, b
.
= b′,
B ⊑ B′, B′ ⊑ B,C ⊑ C′,
A′ ⊑ A} |= ¬
∧
O1
Note that we use here boolean ABoxes. As in the previous
counterexample a purely DL counter example with standard
ABoxes should be constructible.
Proof of 3. Counter examples for (RDP 1), (RDP 3) und
(RDP 4): Consider the same set of ontology axioms as in the
corresponding counter examples for the weak reinterpreta-
tion ⊗γ . The selection function γ can be chosen such that
the same results follow as in the case of ⊗γ .
Counter example for (RDP 2): See counter example for
triggering literal.
References
[Ahmeti, Calvanese, and Polleres 2014] Ahmeti, A.; Cal-
vanese, D.; and Polleres, A. 2014. Updating RDFS aboxes
and tboxes in SPARQL. In Mika, P.; Tudorache, T.; Bern-
stein, A.; Welty, C.; Knoblock, C. A.; Vrandecic, D.; Groth,
P. T.; Noy, N. F.; Janowicz, K.; and Goble, C. A., eds., The
Semantic Web - ISWC 2014 - 13th International Seman-
tic Web Conference, Riva del Garda, Italy, October 19-23,
2014. Proceedings, Part I, volume 8796 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 441–456. Springer.
[Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985] Alchourro´n,
C. E.; Ga¨rdenfors, P.; and Makinson, D. 1985. On the logic
of theory change: partial meet contraction and revision
functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50:510–530.
[Calvanese et al. 2009] Calvanese, D.; De Giacomo, G.;
Lembo, D.; Lenzerini, M.; Poggi, A.; Rodrı´guez-Muro, M.;
and Rosati, R. 2009. Ontologies and databases: The DL-Lite
approach. In Tessaris, S., and Franconi, E., eds., Semantic
Technologies for Informations Systems – 5th Int. Reasoning
Web Summer School (RW 2009), volume 5689 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer. 255–356.
[Darwiche and Pearl 1994] Darwiche, A., and Pearl, J. 1994.
On the logic of iterated belief revision. In Fagin, R., ed.,
Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Theoretical Aspects
of Reasoning about Knowledge (TARK-94), 5–23.
[Darwiche and Pearl 1997] Darwiche, A., and Pearl, J. 1997.
On the logic of iterated belief revision. Artificial intelligence
89:1–29.
[Delgrande and Schaub 2003] Delgrande, J. P., and Schaub,
T. 2003. A consistency-based approach for belief change.
Artificial Intelligence 151(1–2):1–41.
[Delgrande 2008] Delgrande, J. P. 2008. Horn clause belief
change: Contraction functions. In Brewka, G., and Lang, J.,
eds., Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reason-
ing: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference, KR
2008, Sydney, Australia, September 16-19, 2008, 156–165.
AAAI Press.
[Eschenbach and ¨Ozc¸ep 2010] Eschenbach, C., and ¨Ozc¸ep,
¨O. L. 2010. Ontology revision based on reinterpretation.
Logic Journal of the IGPL 18(4):579–616. First published
online August 12, 2009.
[Flouris et al. 2008] Flouris, G.; Manakanatas, D.; Kondy-
lakis, H.; Plexousakis, D.; and Antoniou, G. 2008. Ontology
change: classification and survey. The Knowledge Engineer-
ing Review 23(2):117–152.
[Flouris, Plexousakis, and Antoniou 2005] Flouris, G.; Plex-
ousakis, D.; and Antoniou, G. 2005. On applying the AGM
theory to dls and OWL. In Gil, Y.; Motta, E.; Benjamins,
V. R.; and Musen, M. A., eds., The Semantic Web - ISWC
2005, 4th International Semantic Web Conference, ISWC
2005, Galway, Ireland, November 6-10, 2005, Proceedings,
volume 3729 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 216–
231. Springer.
[Freund and Lehmann 2002] Freund, M., and Lehmann,
D. J. 2002. Belief revision and rational inference. Com-
puting Research Repository (CoRR) cs.AI/0204032.
[Goeb et al. 2007] Goeb, M.; Reiss, P.; Schiemann, B.; and
Schreiber, U. 2007. Dynamic TBox-handling in agent-
agent-communication. In Beierle, C., and Kern-Isberner, G.,
eds., Dynamics of Knowledge and Belief. Proceedings of the
Workshop at the 30th Annual German Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence (KI-2007), 100–117. Fernuniversita¨t in
Hagen.
[Gutierrez, Hurtado, and Vaisman 2011] Gutierrez, C.; Hur-
tado, C.; and Vaisman, A. 2011. Rdfs update: From theory
to practice. In Proceedings of the 8th Extended Semantic
Web Conference on The Semanic Web: Research and Appli-
cations - Volume Part II, ESWC’11, 93–107. Berlin, Heidel-
berg: Springer-Verlag.
[Kharlamov, Zheleznyakov, and Calvanese 2013]
Kharlamov, E.; Zheleznyakov, D.; and Calvanese, D.
2013. Capturing model-based ontology evolution at the
instance level: The case of dl-lite. J. Comput. Syst. Sci.
79(6):835–872.
[Lembo et al. 2015] Lembo, D.; Mora, J.; Rosati, R.; Savo,
D. F.; and Thorstensen, E. 2015. Mapping analysis in
ontology-based data access: Algorithms and complexity. In
et al., M. A., ed., The Semantic Web - ISWC 2015 - 14th In-
ternational Semantic Web Conference, Bethlehem, PA, USA,
October 11-15, 2015, Proceedings, Part I, volume 9366 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 217–234. Springer.
[Meilicke and Stuckenschmidt 2009] Meilicke, C., and
Stuckenschmidt, H. 2009. Reasoning support for mapping
revision. Journal of Logic and Computation.
[ ¨Ozc¸ep 2008] ¨Ozc¸ep, ¨O. L. 2008. Towards principles for
ontology integration. In Eschenbach, C., and Gru¨ninger, M.,
eds., FOIS, volume 183, 137–150. IOS Press.
[ ¨Ozc¸ep 2012] ¨Ozc¸ep, ¨O. L. 2012. Minimality postulates for
semantic integration. In Konieczny, S., and Meyer, T., eds.,
Proceedings of the workshop BNC@ECAI2012, 47–53.
[Qi, Ji, and Haase 2009] Qi, G.; Ji, Q.; and Haase, P. 2009.
A conflict-based operator for mapping revision. In et al.,
B. C. G., ed., Proceedings of the 22nd International Work-
shop on Description Logics (DL-09), volume 477 of CEUR
Workshop Proceedings.
[Ribeiro and Wassermann 2009] Ribeiro, M. M., and
Wassermann, R. 2009. Base revision for ontology
debugging. J. Log. Comput. 19(5):721–743.
[Ribeiro 2012] Ribeiro, M. 2012. Belief Revision in Non-
Classical Logics. SpringerBriefs in Computer Science.
Springer.
